Steve Evans v. MAAX KSD Corp by unknown
2009 Decisions 
Opinions of the United 
States Court of Appeals 
for the Third Circuit 
2-6-2009 
Steve Evans v. MAAX KSD Corp 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2009 
Recommended Citation 
"Steve Evans v. MAAX KSD Corp" (2009). 2009 Decisions. 1906. 
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2009/1906 
This decision is brought to you for free and open access by the Opinions of the United States Court of Appeals for 
the Third Circuit at Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository. It has been accepted for 
inclusion in 2009 Decisions by an authorized administrator of Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law 
Digital Repository. 
1NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
                           
No. 08-1627
                           
STEVE  EVANS,  Appellant
v.
MAAX-KSD CORPORATION
                           
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania
District Court  No. 06-CV-02804
District Judge: The Honorable J. Curtis Joyner
                              
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a)
January 29, 2009
Before: SCIRICA, Chief Judge, AMBRO, and SMITH, Circuit Judges
(Filed: February 6, 2009)
                             
  OPINION
                             
SMITH, Circuit Judge.
After Maax-KSD Corporation terminated Steve Evans’ employment, Evans filed a
complaint in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania. 
Evans alleged that Maax-KSD had violated his rights under the Americans with
The District Court correctly pointed out that Evans’ PHRA claims were governed1
by the same legal standard as his ADA claims.  Kelly v. Drexel Univ., 94 F.3d 102, 105 (3d Cir.
1996).  For that reason, it did not separately analyze Evans’ PHRA claims, but treated them as
coextensive.  Id.  We do likewise.
The District Court had federal question jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331.  We2
have final order jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  We exercise plenary review over the
District Court’s grant of summary judgment.  Turner v. Hershey Chocolate U.S., 440 F.3d 604,
611 (3d Cir. 2006).
2
Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA), 42 U.S.C. § 12112 and § 12203(a), and the Pennsylvania
Human Relations Act (PHRA), 43 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 955(a) and (d), by terminating his
employment and by retaliating against him for filing a charge of disability discrimination.
Maax-KSD moved for summary judgment after the close of discovery.  The
District Court granted the motion.  It concluded that Evans had failed to establish a prima
facie case not only of discrimination, but also retaliation.   In addition, the Court observed1
that even if a prima facie case existed, Evans had failed to adduce any evidence that
Maax-KSD’s reason for discharging him was a pretext for discrimination or retaliation. 
Evans appealed.2
After a careful review of the record, we agree with the District Court’s analysis. 
Evans did not adduce sufficient evidence to establish that he had a permanent or long
term impairment that substantially affected a major life activity, thereby constituting a
disability under the ADA.   See Toyota Motor Mfg. v. Williams, 534 U.S. 184, 198 (2002). 
Inasmuch as the existence of a disability is a prima facie element of a claim of disability
discrimination, Evans’ claim of disability discrimination cannot survive summary
judgment.  Kelly v. Drexel Univ., 94 F.3d 102, 105 (3d Cir. 1996). 
Nor do we find any error by the District Court in granting summary judgment on
Evans’ retaliation claims.  As the District Court explained, Evans failed to establish that
he engaged in protected activity under the Act.  In Fogleman v. Mercy Hospital, 283 F.3d
561 (3d Cir. 2002), we noted that in order to establish a prima facie case of illegal
retaliation in an ADA claim, a plaintiff must show, inter alia, that he engaged in protected
activity.  Id. at 567-68.  Section 12203(a) provides that this predicate activity may be as a
result of opposition to any act or practice made unlawful or “because such individual
made a charge, testified, assisted or participated in any manner in an investigation,
proceeding, or hearing under this chapter.”  42 U.S.C. § 12203(a).  Although it was
Evans’ burden to show that he engaged in protected activity, the record established that
Maax-KSD had never been served with a charge of discrimination or a request for
accommodation prior to terminating Evans’ employment.  As the District Court pointed
out, Evans admitted during his deposition that he had mistakenly believed that a charge
had been filed three months before his termination, and that he stated as much to his
employer on the day of his termination.  In the absence of evidence indicating that a
charge of discrimination had actually been filed or that Evans had engaged in protected
activity, it was not improper for the District Court to conclude that Evans had failed to
establish a prima facie element of his claim of retaliation.
For the above reasons, we will affirm.
